package consisting of a theoretical model for explaining cancer, the oncogene theory, and recombinant DNA technologies for testing the theory. Oncogene proponents hold that cancer is caused by normal cellular genes called "proto-oncogenes" that somehow turn into cancer genes, loosely called "oncogenes." I focus on the construction and marketing of the theorymethods package by oncogene researchers and the buying and importing of the package by their colleagues, members of other lines of research, funding agencies, and suppliers. Early oncogene researchers used this package to push their lines of research and generated a bandwagon that redefined the work organization in many cancer research laboratories. The collective commitments of resources made by early bandwagon joiners set the conditions for gaining new adherents (scientists, laboratories, and organizations) through a "snowball effect." By 1984, the bandwagon was sustained by its own momentum and researchers climbed on primarily because it was a bandwagon.
Intersecting Social Worlds in Cancer Research
Scientific problem-solving and fact-making are collective enterprises organized generally along different lines of research, research traditions, and disciplines (Gerson, 1983a). When individuals and organizations commit their resources to a line of research, they are committing themselves to a particular set of problems and oftentimes methods.
Changes in commitment are expensive and require new investments of resources. Moreover, these changes in the conventions of work, including scientific work, occur only through the cooperation of people from diverse social worlds (cf. Becker, 1982; Shibutani, 1955; Strauss et al., 1985) . Why would scientists and organizations with existing resource investments in different lines of research be willing to commit their resources to this particular new approach? And how do these members from different social worlds come to practice a common approach to studying cancer?
We can begin to understand these changes by borrowing Everett Hughes's (1971) view of the workplace as "where [diverse] peoples meet." Work gets done in these places only through the conflict, struggle, and negotiations over a set of conventions to guide action and interaction at this meeting of worlds. Here, cancer research is the workplace, the arena where different social worlds meet, and the negotiations are about how one should approach solving the problem of cancer (see Shibutani, 1955 ; and Strauss, 1978b on arenas). Beginning in the late 1970s in the United States, participants from many different lines of work came to agreement on how best to study cancer. The molecular biological approach has gained an increasing proportion of cancer research commitments although basic, clinical, and epidemiological research with no ties to molecular biological methods continue. That is, in the struggle to define their common object, cancer, molecular biologists and tumor virologists have won acceptance of their definition of the situation by other researchers, sponsors, suppliers, and diverse participants in the cancer research arena. Cancer has become defined for many people as a disease of the DNA, to be studied through oncogene theory and recombinant DNA technologies. The story of this bandwagon's development then is also the story of how molecular biologists managed to impose their definition of the situation on much of the larger world of cancer research.
In the battle over whose "fact" is more "factual," Callon (1985) and Latour (1987) argue that actors enroll allies much as military leaders enlist armies and weapons. A major strategy used by scientists in fact-making is to translate others' interests into their own interests. More generally, translation is the mechanism by which certain entities gain control over the way society and nature are organized, by which "a few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized" (Callon, 1985:224) .
Packages in Bandwagon Development: From Custom Tailoring to
One-Size-Fits-All Scientists' commitments are organized into three major interdependent sets of activities that define their work: problem-solving, career-building, and line-of-research-building. Problem-solving in basic science is rarely standardized and requires enormous amounts of work to sort through all the combinations of variables. Results are never assured. Constructing "doable" problems, or successful research projects, is an uncertain process (Fujimura, 1987) . For any project to succeed, scientists must negotiate tasks ranging from convincing funding agencies of the project's worth to making or buying necessary supplies to experimental manipulations of DNA. For example, to carry out an experiment, scientists must pull together diverse elements including funds, laboratory space and infrastructure, staff, skills, technologies, research materials, and audiences for the experimental results. This has been called articulation work (Bendifallah and Scacchi, 1987; Fujimura, 1987; Gasser, 1984; Star, 1985; Strauss, 1988; Strauss, et al., 1985) . Uncertainty and ambiguity reign at every turn in research paths and require constant surveillance, discretionary decision-making, regular reorganization of activities, and more (Fujimura, 1986a; Gasser, 1984; Zeldenrust, 1985; Star, 1985) .
At the same time, scientists are constrained by the requirements of career-building. Since the end of the nineteenth century, industrialization has changed the organization of scientific work in American universities into a rationalized system of production of new knowledge and technologies for "market" consumption (Gerson, 1983b). Basic scientists became "professionals" who were located in research universities. In the university context, scientists are now judged by the amount and quality of their publications and by their students. University molecular biologists, for example, build careers primarily by publishing papers based on the results of laboratory experiments. Even molecular biologists located in private biotechnology companies still build careers through publications (Fujimura, 1986b) . They require funds to build their labs and conduct experiments. Further, time scales for experimental results have shrunk in recent years. No scientist today can spend five years to produce results and publications and still expect to win research grants. A tumor virologist with whom I spoke said:
Researchers have to convince the funding sources that their studies will produce progress, results, within a political time span. .. . If you tell them not to expect progress in five years, they won't fund you.... The whole structure of science is pushing for quick results ... Organizations and institutions also have careers. University departments, universities, research institutes, and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are betting resources on molecular biological cancer research with the goal of ensuring or increasing productivity, maintaining their own existence, and increasing their power and credibility (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) . Problem-solving under highly uncertain conditions and career-building in the context of rationalized knowledge production seem diametrically opposed. Under these conditions, scientists and organizations make commitments to particular lines of research. They aim to construct doable problems which will produce novel information and marketable products within short time frames.
The careers of research traditions can vary in duration, growth or decline, amount and degree of participant support, and kinds of activities and concerns. Scientists, supplying and sponsoring organizations, and academic and commercial research enterprises are committed to the continuance and growth of a line of research because the careers of these lines of research are tightly tied to individual and organizational careers.
In this context, one way to attract adherents to one's approach to a problem and to build up a line of research is to provide a way of organizing work that facilitates the construction of doable problems for scientists, research institutes, and commercial laboratories. Latour (1987:109) argues similarly that the first and easiest way to find people who will immediately believe the statement, invest in the project, or buy the prototype, is to tailor the object in such a way that it caters [to] these people's explicit interests... " [I] nterests" are what lie in between actors and their goals, thus creating a tension that will make actors select only what, in their own eyes, helps them reach these goals amongst many possibilities [first emphasis added].
In the case studied here, one approach succeeded in quickly "translating the interests" of many members of different social worlds. However, diverse worlds usually have diverse problems and concerns. Tailoring the "object" for each world is a very expensive strategy, requiring much negotiation and many resources. The question then is how the molecular biological approach to understanding cancer succeeded in winning the commitments (or "translating the interests") of members of these different worlds.
The following case study of the molecular biological cancer research bandwagon tells the story of the efforts of certain scientists who constructed a "package" and then convinced members of diverse social worlds that they could use it to construct doable problems.
The Molecular Biological Bandwagon in Cancer Research
Since 1978 the National Cancer Institute has awarded an increasing amount of its basic research funds (versus clinical and educational funds) to molecular biological studies of cancer. Before 1983 the National Institutes of Health (NIH) had no category for oncogenes (or cancer genes) in its computer databank of funded projects. In 1983, the NIH instituted an oncogene category and listed the number of sponsored projects at 54 and the number of dollars disbursed to oncogene projects at $5.5 million. By 1987 the NIH was distributing $103.2 million to 648 oncogene projects. NIH support for projects on genetic manipulation in cancer research grew from $16.3 million in 1977 to $194.4 million in 1987.
Molecular biological cancer research articles increasingly crowded the pages of general science journals like Science and Nature as well as journals specializing in biochemistry, molecular biology, and cancer research. By 1984 the journal Science wrote that "the evidence implicating oncogenes as causes of human cancers, although still circumstantial, has been accumulating rapidly during the past few years" (Marx, 1984: 2). In 1984 even popular weekly magazines like Newsweek carried articles on oncogenes (Clark, 1983; Clark and Witherspoon, 1984; .
New investigators chose to study oncogenes, and even established investigators shifted their research agendas to include oncogene or oncogene-related problems. Cancer research institutes changed their agendas by hiring molecular biologically trained researchers and establishing the proper facilities. The Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, the country's oldest and largest research and hospital complex devoted exclusively to cancer, recently shifted from immunology to molecular biology. A molecular biologist, Paul Marks, was appointed to head the organization, and he replaced the old leadership with molecular biologists. A respondent outside the organization commented to me on Marks's agenda: "So now 
The State of Cancer Research Before the 1970s
Cancer is the name given to over a hundred different diseases, all of which have one property in common: uncontrolled cell growth. Scientists have studied cancer for a century from many different perspectives and using many different technologies (Bud, 1978; Cairns, 1978; Fujimura, 1986b; Rather, 1978; Studer and Chubin, 1980 ), yet except for some success at treating a few leukemias, there are no cures or reliable treatments for solid tumors, which form the large percentage of human cancers. Still the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on cancer research by the National Institutes of Health (including the NCI), the American Cancer Society, and other private foundations make it an attractive area of research. The search for the elusive "magic bullet" goes on.
Prior to the development of recombinant DNA technologies in the mid-1970s, cancer research was populated by endocrinologists, immunologists, classical geneticists, biochemists, chemotherapists, and medical researchers of all kinds. Molecular biologists played a limited role. Many researchers pursued the causes of cancer at the cellular and whole organism level. These lines of research included studies of the roles of chemicals, hormones, and radiation in cell transformation. Classical geneticists studied the role of genes in cancer using inbred mice strains and tumor transplantation experiments. Tumor virologists examined the roles of various types of animal viruses and viral oncogenes in cell transformation, often using established cell lines (for a review of these approaches, see Shimkin, 1977) . However, until the mid-1970s, researchers had no technologies for testing theories of cancer at the molecular level.
The Development of Recombinant DNA Technologies
Recombinant DNA technology provided a method for manipulating eukaryotic cell DNA. Molecular biologists had previously focussed their research on prokaryotes (simple organisms like bacteria, viruses, and algae whose cells have no defined nuclei). The new methods permitted research on higher organisms whose DNA are enclosed in structurally discrete nuclei (eukaryotes). Since the ultimate goal of this research is to find a cure for human cancer and since humans are mammals with complex eukaryotic DNA, no molecular biological research on human cancer was possible until the mid-1970s.
In 1973, molecular biologists artificially recombined the DNA of two different species, a prokaryote and a eukaryote (Morrow et al., 1974) . According to Wright (1986:315) , the impact of this new capacity to move pieces of DNA between species at will was immediately understood by molecular biologists in the dual scientific and practical terms that characterized the perceptions of its inventors. On the one hand, they saw the ability to do controlled genetic engineer- Recombination by itself, however, did not allow scientists to do controlled experiments at the molecular level. Molecular biologists needed other techniques, including the cloning, sequencing, mapping, and expressing of genes, before they could easily manipulate DNA to do controlled genetic engineering experiments. By 1977, molecular biologists had developed cloning techniques that allowed them to insert eukaryotic DNA into and among bacterial DNA. They could then grow the bacteria to produce more copies of the isolated foreign piece of DNA in order to analyze it. By 1977 they had also developed faster and more efficient sequencing techniques, which they used to delineate the location of genes on the genome (the complete genetic message of an individual organism) and later to map out the structure of entire genomes, or at least of smaller genomes. Finally, molecular biologists also developed new methods to make the recombined eukaryotic genes, especially mammalian genes, express themselves in bacterial systems. Gene expression is the transformation of the genetic code into the proteins which make the cell function. Gene transfer was one of these new methods. While some molecular biologists used cloning and sequencing techniques to study the DNA structure and the location of genes on the DNA, others used gene transfer techniques-introducing foreign DNA sequences into living cells-to study the functions of genes and gene fragments. However, the techniques were still not standardized enough for researchers other than recombinant DNA methodologists to use efficiently in pursuing other biological problems.
Standardization of Recombinant DNA Technologies
The bandwagon was further developed with the standardization of recombinant DNA technologies. Even if scientists want to incorporate new technologies into their work, they may not be able to do so for lack of funding, available skills, time, or other needed resources. Scientists working in existing laboratories and institutions have made major commitments of resources to particular problems and approaches to those problems. Altering current problem paths requires making changes in ongoing organizations of work: acquiring new skills and knowledge, hiring new staff, and buying new instruments and supplies. Yet, scientists in both university and commercial laboratories tend to work within relatively stable resource allotments that can rise or fall in small increments. They can gain additional resources only through the expenditure of other resources (time and effort taken away from experimental work to write grants or put on "roadshows"). Thus, preferred changes are relatively inexpensive. Investing in standardized technologies is, in fact, an economical way around resource constraints, if entry costs are low enough.
Standardized technologies are tacit knowledge made explicit and routine via simplification and the deletion of the contexts in which the technologies were developed (Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Star, 1983) . They are conventions for action that are carried with little or no change from one context to another. Standardized technologies take the form of pre-fabricated biological materials (reagents, probes), procedural manuals (often called "cookbooks") spelling out "recipes" for action, industrial standards, computing protocols, and instruments that automate many procedures (Fujimura, 1987; Gerson, 1977, 1978) .
Because they are explicit and routine procedures, standardized technologies are highly transportable. They reduce the amount of tacit knowledge, discretionary decision-making, or trial-and-error work needed to solve problems. What is done to which material for what reason or purpose and with what outcome are all built into the "black box" of transportable technologies. Thus, they are easier to learn and cost less time and effort in retraining and monitoring laboratory staff. To illustrate, before the development of standardized electrophor-esis procedures and equipment, a molecular biologist would need "golden hands" to separate DNA lengths of different molecular weights using the centrifuge. Most researchers found the centrifuge too clumsy a tool for such delicate work. Thus, few researchers performed experiments requiring separation techniques until the development and marketing of electrophoresis procedures and equipment. With the development of standardization, experiments requiring the technique flourished.
Finally, these technologies have to be financially affordable in many laboratories for a bandwagon to roll. Standardized technologies allow for rationalized production and distribution of the materials, techniques, and instruments. This reduces the costs of consumption, while economies of scale in production firms reduces the unit cost of the goods. The net result is reduced entry costs.
By saving in training efforts, time, trial-and-error procedures, and/or material costs, standardized technologies reduce the costs of importing them into uninitiated laboratories and the costs of doing research in each laboratory. Reduced costs increase the number of experiments that can be done in a given laboratory with a given budget.
By 1980 To find out how easy and accurate DNA sequencing was, I asked a student, Gregor Sutcliffe, to sequence the ampicillin resistance gene . . . of Escherichia coli.... All he knew about the protein was an approximate molecular weight, and that a certain restriction cut on the [pBR322j plasmid inactivated that gene. He had no previous experience with DNA sequencing when he set out to work out the structure of DNA for his gene. After 7 months he had worked out about 1000 bases of double-stranded DNA, sequencing one strand and then sequencing the other for confirmation.... The DNA sequencing was correct. Sutcliffe then became very enthusiastic and sequenced the rest of plasmid pBR322 during the next 6 months, to finish his thesis (quoted in Cherfas, 1982:124 Perhaps the most common use of DNA synthesis today is to make "probes" that help locate a natural gene of scientific or commercial interest-such as that for human growth hormone, insulin, or interferon-among thousands of different genes in the DNA of a cell. ... [flinding a particular gene is akin to searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Fortunately, the ability to make pieces of [complementary] synthetic DNA has greatly simplified the search (Tucker, 1984:52).
The first automated DNA synthesizer was introduced in 1981. By 1984 seven more reliable machines were on the market and operating in biotechnology companies. A 1986 article reported: "[t]he chemistry has been refined to such a degree that the synthesis of oligonucleotides up to 50 bases in length has become routine and oligonucleotides longer than 100 bases have been synthesized" (Smith, 1986:G63) .
In 1986, automated DNA sequenators took the facility and efficiency described by Gilbert one step further. The operator need only know what solvents and reagents to put into the instruments. The sequenators thus reduce training requirements even more. Sets of tasks that once were considered thesis problems are now routinely performed by machines.
Thus, even researchers who were not at Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, or Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, the institutions where the "state-of-the-art" technologies were being developed, were able to easily acquire the materials and tools needed for recombinant DNA research. Standardization has also allowed for rationalized production and distribution of the materials, techniques, and instruments used in recombinant DNA research. Thus, the cost of the research has been reduced to affordable levels.
The Oncogene Theory: One-Size-Fits-All
The development and standardization of recombinant DNA and other molecular biological technologies, however, were not solely responsible for the molecular biological cancer research bandwagon. Theories of cancer framed around DNA were also part of the package. Researchers used such theories to guide their use of recombinant DNA technologies and to interpret the results of such applications. Oncogene theory is an important example as it played a ideological role in the initial bandwagon formation.
While some molecular biologists tinkered at improving recombinant DNA technologies, others further explored the structure of DNA, and still others applied the techniques to longstanding questions in almost all biological disciplines (Kumar, 1984:ix) . Molecular biologists regarded recombinant DNA technologies and eukaryotic cell genes as the keys to the previously locked doors in normal differentiation and development, cell proliferation, cancer, and even evolution. A group of molecular biologists and a group of tumor virologists took the opportunity to apply the techniques via the oncogene theory to build new lines of research on human cancer. In the late 1970s, a few molecular biologists and tumor virologists were engaged in two separate lines of research on the molecular mechanisms of cancer causation. The tumor virologists claimed they had found a class of genes in the normal cell that can be triggered to transform the normal cell into a cancer cell (Bishop, 1982; Fujimura, 1986b; Weinberg, 1983) . In 1983, Weinberg, a molecular biologist, and his associates claimed their oncogenes to be in the same class as those found by tumor virologists:
Two independent lines of work, each pursuing cellular oncogenes, have converged over the last several years. Initially, the two research areas confronted problems that were ostensibly unconnected. The first focused on the mechanisms by which a variety of animal retroviruses were able to transform infected cells and induce tumors in their own host species. The other, using procedures of gene transfer, investigated the molecular mechanisms responsible for tumors of nonviral origin, such as those human tumors traceable to chemical causes. We now realize that common molecular determinants may be responsible for tumors of both classes. These determinants, the cellular oncogenes, constitute a functionally heterogeneous group of genes, members of which may cooperate with one another in order to achieve the transformation of cells (Land et al., 1984: 391; emphasis added).
Although their data came from two different areas of research, both groups used recombinant DNA technologies to try to prove their claims. They posited several types of triggering mechanisms. There are many little debates among oncogene researchers about specifics, but the general oncogene theory has become the most popular theory of cancer causation in the 1980s.
These tumor virologists and molecular biologists framed the oncogene theory in a way that they claimed encompassed and unified many other areas of cancer research. They claimed that further investigation using the oncogene framework would produce explanations at the molecular level for problems previously pursued in classical genetic, chemical, radiation, hormonal, and viral lines of research on cancer. They also proposed connections between their theory and other work in the molecular biology of normal growth and differentiation. At the time (and at present), the oncogene theory was the only coherent theory for activities at the molecular level in oncogenesis. The claims were quite grandiose. scientists envision the development of drugs designed to specifically inhibit oncogenes. These would be far better than anticancer drugs that indiscriminately kill normal cells along with cancerous ones. "We would," says Frank Rauscher of the American Cancer Society, "be using a rifle rather than a shotgun."
The unifying theory appealed to scientists because of its elegance, a term they use to describe a theory that can precisely and simply explain many disparate observations. Oncogene theory proponents claimed to have developed a "one-size-fits-all," molecular explanation for many different types (classifications) and causes (causal explanations) of cancer. The ultimate claim was that their research might lead to a common cure, a "magic bullet" for cancer.
Marketing the Package
Claiming that one's theory unifies many lines of research, however, does not mean that others will agree with the claim and rush to pursue experiments based on the theory. In the fifth stage, tumor virologists and molecular biologists jockeyed for position and finally joined forces to construct and promote the package of the oncogene theory and recombinant DNA technologies. They marketed the package as a tool by which other researchers could transmute their work organizations and construct doable problems. Incentives for "old-fashioned" cancer researchers included a chance to use "hot," new recombinant DNA technologies. Molecular biologists were offered a chance to attack the human cancer problem through the oncogene theory. These incentives contributed to the development of the bandwagon.
Oncogene theory proponents enrolled allies behind their package not only by claiming to have accounted for findings in many other lines of cancer research, but also by framing and posing new doable problems on oncogenes for other researchers to investigate. That is, they posed questions which: (1) scientists could experimentally investigate using recombinant DNA and other molecular biological technologies; (2) laboratories were already organized and equipped with resources to handle, or could relatively easily import the requisite resources; and (3) satisfied significant audiences.
The proposed problems were both specific and general. Researchers could immediately begin experimentation on specific problems, while thinking of possible ways to translate more general problems into specific experiments. Oncogene theorists also used other strategies to gain allies. For example, in 1984 they established the first of annual national meetings devoted entirely to oncogene research. At a more hands-on level, they distributed their probes for oncogenes to other laboratories and to suppliers, thus facilitating the spread of oncogene research by providing standardized tools. One oncogene researcher told me:
J. Michael Bishop
We've had so many requests for our probes for [two cellular oncogenes] that we had one technician working full-time on making and sending them out. So we finally turned over the stocks to the American Type Culture Collection.
These probes were more than physical materials. They were "black boxes," designed with reference to specific hypotheses about their involvement in cancer causation. Any researcher can call or write to ATCC to order the probes at the cost of maintenance and shipping. In other words, oncogene researchers made the tools for testing and exploring their theory available and accessible to a host of other researchers.
Oncogene theory proponents taught and talked about their work to students and researchers in other biological disciplines. A respondent described the positive response of cell biology conference participants to an oncogene promotion talk. Most of the conference participants, uninitiated in the complexities of oncogene research, were awed by the promotion and unable to evaluate the difficulties in the data. Proponents also spoke about their work in the popular media. On October 6, 1987 the New York Times published an article headlined "Young Science of Cancer Genes Begins to Yield Practical Applications."
Efforts to build lines of research and to gain allies for particular perspectives, theories, and research are common. The issue here is not that tumor virologists and molecular biologists attempted to gain allies but how they did it and why they succeeded. I have discussed their strategies for gaining allies here. Next I discuss why they succeeded.
"Buying" the Package: Many Prizes in the Box The decisions of individual researchers, funding agencies, research institutes, and private companies to pursue oncogene research were based on their goals: to construct doable problems, build careers, produce marketable products, and build successful "going concerns" (Hughes, 1971 ).
Researchers do not readily alter successful research programs just to pursue new opportunities. As I argued elsewhere (Fujimura, 1986a), they redirect, shift, or add to their problem paths when opportunities outweigh costs or when they cannot work around contingencies that block further progress. New recruits decided to import the package and change the course of their research because: (1) the oncogene theory offered the chance to pursue research on human cancer; (2) the package of oncogene theory and recombinant DNA technologies provided a pathway to exploring new, uncharted territory ("sexy" problems); (3) researchers could incorporate the new, "hot" standardized recombinant DNA technologies into their laboratories at relatively economical start-up costs; (4) work in some laboratories had led to "dead-ends" or "roadblocks," while work in some cancer research institutes had been criticized as "old-fashioned." The package of oncogene theory and recombinant DNA technologies fit both organizationally and intellectually with the requirements, goals, and conditions of the work of researchers in several different lines of work. If NCI allows spending on oncogene research to expand naturally, does this mean less prominence for important traditional fields such as chemotherapy? DeVita says that some other work must obviously go, given the fact that NCI is unlikely to receive any budget increases in the next few years. He notes that chemotherapy has been cut by about 30 percent in the past six years on scientific grounds: "some things we didn't need to do any more," he says. Besides interesting intellectual questions and the problem of curing cancer, new researchers had to attend to career development contingencies in making problem choices. The immediate foreground was filled with the exigencies of their daily work lives: researching and writing Ph.D. theses, establishing and maintaining laboratories and staff, publishing and gaining tenure, writing grant proposals, attracting and training students. Constructing doable problems that produce results that someone will publish is a practical and pressing concern. Thus, desirable "cancer research" becomes "doable research." Students and beginning researchers gained major advantages for establishing their careers and laboratories by choosing to investigate problems under the rubric of oncogene research. By 1982 these advantages included clearly articulated experiments, research funds, high credibility, short-term projects, increased job opportunities, and the promised generation of downstream doable problems.
Incentives for Tumor
By 1982 Very few biologists would be willing to attack findings based on results from a mass spectrometer, often used in molecular biological experiments, because physics ranks high among scientific hierarchies of credibility (Becker, 1967; Gerson and Star, 1988 ). Although power is negotiated, the relative power of the negotiating parties matters (Strauss, 1978a) . Since many molecular biological methods came from physics and chemistry, oncogene researchers increase their negotiating power and credibility by enrolling recombinant DNA and other molecular biological technologies. That is, they are adding the appeal, legitimacy, and credibility of molecular biology, physics, and chemistry to the construction of their "facts." For these reasons, oncogene research problems were extremely good bets in the early 1980s for gaining marketable problems, skills, support, and products.
In addition, new researchers increased their chances for successful future careers by enrolling molecular biological technologies. Molecular biology has steadily expanded its boundaries during the past two decades. There are very few fields of research and biological disciplines that molecular biologists have not entered. University biology departments, re-search institutes, commercial biotechnology companies, and pharmaceutical companies all continue to vie for the best molecular biologists in the world (Stokes, 1985; Wright, 1986) . Expansion of genetic screening programs for inherited diseases have extended the impact of molecular biology to the public, including private citizens, insurance companies, and governments (Duster, 1981 (Duster, , 1987 ). If only for the chance to gain highly marketable molecular biological skills, then, oncogene research became a good bet for graduate and postdoctoral students. A postdoctoral student training in an oncogene laboratory specifically stated his view that his research on oncogenes, with one foot in cancer and the other in molecular biology, would definitely get him a job in either the university or in industry.
Cancer , in other words, some preliminary data. So he has to start his project on a shoestring. It has to be something he can do quickly, get data fast, and be able to use that data to support a grant application ... so that he can be advanced and maintain his job. Therefore, he doesn't go to the fundamental problems that are very difficult.... So he goes to the bandwagon, and takes one little piece of that and adds to that well-plowed field. That means that his science is more superficial than it should be. And that's bad for the field of science.
Thus, if it takes many more years to construct a doable problem using one approach versus another, most researchers choose the shorter, surer bet.
At this stage of the bandwagon's development, early oncogene researchers had circulated claims that problems framed in terms of their package were fast, highly doable, highly credible, and highly productive. They had lined up sponsors, integrated transportable recombinant DNA technologies, worked their way into the human cancer and normal cell genomes, and connected oncogenes to many other lines of research, including the "hot areas" of evolutionary biology and normal growth and differentiation. They had connected such heterogeneous things as human cancer, a class of genes called oncogenes, recombinant DNA technologies, normal growth and differentiation, and the National Cancer Institute. They had persuaded other researchers and funding agencies that, because of these connections, oncogene research would satisfy their interests and the demands put upon them by their sponsors, colleagues, students, and university administrations. With respect to many worlds within cancer research and molecular biology, then, the oncogene theory held high privilege (Gerson and Star, 1984) . Presented with such a highly privileged theory as an incentive in a race for time, new investigators jumped on the bandwagon.
Finally, new and more established investigators also bought the package because of promised intellectual payoff and new generations of downstream questions. Novel findings from oncogene research were not only useful for fattening publications lists for academic researchers. They were also intellectually "hot." For example, in 1983, Nature (Newmark, 1983:470) Established researchers also found the possibilities for exploring new levels of analysis useful. An example was the senior investigator who had been studying the effect of radiation on transforming cells in culture. After much excitement about the oncogene theories of carcinogenesis, he sent his student to train in recombinant DNA techniques in a nearby laboratory in order to test two hypotheses: first, whether radiation played a role in mutating or transposing one or several proto-oncogenes and, second, whether radiation damage to cells made it easier for the viral oncogene to become integrated into the normal cellular genome. Thus, the graduate student gained the benefits enrolled behind the oncogene theory, and the senior investigator imported new skills and a new line of research into his laboratory. There appear then to be many benefits to be gained from pursuing oncogene research.
Incentives for Private Industry. Despite the uncertain commercial payoff from oncogene research, several large pharmaceutical companies and major research and development (R & D) companies have committed funds, researchers, and laboratories to oncogene research and recombinant DNA technologies (Koenig, 1985) . These "betting" pharmaceuticals include Hoffman-La Roche Inc., Smith Kline Beckman Corporation, Merck and Co., and Abbot Laboratories. Investing R & D biotechnology companies include Genentech and Cetus and especially smaller companies aimed specifically at oncogene products including Oncogene Science Inc., Oncogen, and Centocor Oncogene Research Partners.
One respondent regarded these commitments as an effort to "get in on the ground floor." Even if a particular company is not the home of the desired new discovery that leads to a patentable diagnostic or therapeutic product, it will have established the infrastructure for early entry into the race to produce the final commercial product(s). A research director at Hoffman-La Roche stated, "If you're interested in [oncogene] products, you can't afford not to be in the race now" (Koenig, 1985:25) .
Commercial biological material suppliers, however, could invest in oncogene materials only with the arrival of standardized technologies. They would not have been able to profit on high-cost, state-of-the-art technologies. Stephen Turner founded Oncor to capitalize on the emerging diagnostic market from recent developments in cancer molecular biology.... There is no clear-cut link between oncogenes and clinical claims, but I'm gambling that it will happen. It was a greater risk a year ago than today. Look at Nature; there are four to five articles per week about oncogenes (quoted in Johnson, 1984:18) .
Turner also referred to other commitments made to this goal by Oncogen (another small biotechnology supply firm), a collaboration between Genetic Systems and Syntex, and a joint venture between Becton-Dickinson (a large, diversified biological research supply company) and Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. In Turner's words, clearly this is a hot area. My business goal is not unique.... In cancer molecular biology, there is a need for standard reagents in highly convenient, quality-controlled assays that researchers can use to detect human and other species of oncogenes, genetic arrangements, gene amplification and gene expression (Johnson, 1984:18) .
While Turner aimed his efforts at the long-term goal of supplying clinical researchers with tools for diagnosing tumors in human patients, his immediate clients were basic cancer researchers. They used the products to manipulate genes and tumor tissue in their fundamental research in test tubes, petri dishes, and lab animals. A well-worn photocopy of an advertisement for Oncor products from the journal Science was taped to the wall by one graduate student's bench in an academic oncogene research laboratory.
These commitments to oncogene research on the part of private industry refer back to similar commitments of new researchers. These commercial investments provide both job opportunities and more affordable research tools for new investigators jumping on the bandwagon. The Bandwagon's "Snowball" Effect By 1984 the molecular biological cancer research bandwagon was a distinct phenomenon. Scientists were acting on the basis of its existence. Researchers referred to the oncogene bandwagon in conversations. More generally, modem biology was molecular biology. The bandwagon had grown to the point where it was sustained by its own momentum. That is, researchers joined the bandwagon primarily because it was a bandwagon, its continued growth produced by a "snowball" effect.
Actors from diverse social worlds had committed their resources to molecular biological cancer research. These commitments included: (1) very large increases in funding allocations; (2) designated positions in academic departments, research institutes, and private industrial laboratories; (3) easily accessible training and tools, including knowledge, standardized technologies, materials, and instruments; and (4) a cadre of researchers training in molecular biological skills. That is, an infrastructure of skills, funding allocations, committed researchers and teachers, positions committed to molecular biologists, biological material suppliers, and even whole companies and research institutes committed to oncogene research problems was established by 1984. This infrastructure then constrained and influenced the decisions of new investigators. It served to maintain previous commitments as well as to gain new commitments.
Molecular biological cancer research by 1984 appeared to new investigators to be the research line of choice. Scientists joined the bandwagon in order to build successful careers. For many new researchers, this decision to jump on the bandwagon to construct and solve problems on cancer in molecular biological terms was independent of whether or not the problems would yield cures for cancer. Building individual and collective careers was their foremost concern. While curing cancer would be a welcome reward, it was only one consideration among many for their decisions to jump on the bandwagon. research and the molecular biology of cancer, we find an intersection among multiple different lines of work that arose very quickly.
The standardized package facilitated this bandwagon's rapid development because it facilitated interaction among members of different social worlds.4 Its conventionalized ways of carrying out tasks (or standard operating procedures) allowed people in different lines of work to adopt and incorporate them into their laboratories and ongoing enterprises more easily and quickly. That is, it facilitated the flow of resources among many different lines of work. People in one line of research could rapidly and relatively easily adopt resources from another line of research and come to a common practice.
The success of molecular biologists' and tumor virologists' marketing efforts to many different social worlds was largely due to the following: first, the theory-method package provided procedures for a relatively straightforward construction of doable problems, or what Kuhn (1970) would call "normal science." Second, the experiments involved new, "sexy," recombinant DNA techniques, as compared with old, well-known routines. Third, early oncogene theorists demonstrated that, within their model, their doable problems quickly produced novel information about cancer at the molecular level. As scientists making maps of nature, they attempted to chart previously unexplored territory, that is, cancer at the molecular level of analysis. However, anyone entering uncharted territory will likely find something interesting, some new way of representing nature. Finally, then, this particular representation of cancer won so many allies because the theory-method package fit within the institutional and organizational constraints of scientific work of these multiple different social worlds.
